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Abstract 
The awareness on the risk management and internal control disclosure among the Malaysian public listed firms had increased 
since the global financial crisis in 2007 to 2009. In Malaysia, public listed firms must ensure accurate and timely disclosure of 
material information to the investors under the Companies Act 1965 and the guidelines issued by the Securities Commission and 
Bursa Malaysia. The current change in the public listed firms reporting is the implementation of the revised guidance known as 
Statement on Risk Management and Internal Control: Guidelines for Directors of Listed Issuers which was released on 31 
December 2012. The guidelines are intended to guide directors in making disclosures concerning risk management and internal 
control in their firm’s annual report pursuant to paragraph 15.26(b) of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement. This study 
attempts a) to develop an index to measure the level of risk management and internal control disclosures for Malaysian listed 
firms and b) to measure the relationship between the board characteristics and risk management and internal control disclosures 
level among Malaysian public listed firms. The sample of this study consists of 150 firms listed in the Main Market of Bursa 
Malaysia for the year 2013. The study reveals that the disclosure level reflects good compliance level among public listed firms 
and indicates that the board characteristics are effective in monitoring role on risk management and internal control disclosure 
among Malaysian public listed firms. 
 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Universiti Teknologi MARA Johor. 
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1. Introduction 
Information related to corporate governance such as internal control and risk management system could help the 
companies to fulfill the need of the investors (Ismail and Rahman, 2011). According to Ismail and Rahman (2011), 
reporting on the risks will help to inform investors about the companies’ future financial position. The Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 was a wake-up call for corporate governance structure in Malaysia (Sulaiman 2012). The 
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crisis has caused many companies to collapse. Sulaiman (2012) concluded that lack of corporate governance, weak 
internal control and risk management system were viewed as determinants of the collapsed companies.  
The Government has enhanced the governance mechanisms by improving the guidelines and principles for listed 
firms. In terms of financial reporting, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) has been approved by 
the high level Finance Committee of Corporate Governance which is a mandatory requirement for all public listed 
companies in Malaysia. The MCCG has been issued with an amendment to the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements (BMLR) for instance; Chapter 15: Corporate Governance to maintain the market integrity and 
protecting investors’ interests and enhancing their confidence to the Malaysian capital market. The MCCG 2012 sets 
out 8 broad principles and Principle 6 of the MCCG 2012 states that the board of directors should establish a sound 
risk management framework and internal control system. With reference to Principle 6 of MCCG 2012, the 
Statement on Risk Management and Internal Control: Guidelines for Directors of Listed Issuers was released on 31 
December 2012 that incorporates the revision made to the Statement on Risk Management and Internal Control: 
Guidelines for Directors of Listed Issuers which was issued in 2000.  
Statement on Risk Management and Internal Control: Guidelines for Directors of Listed Issuers are intended to 
guide directors in making disclosures concerning risk management and internal control in their company’s annual 
report pursuant to Paragraph 15.26(b) of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad’s Main Market Listing Requirements. 
This guideline emphasis on the need for proper risk management which is a critical aspect of a sound internal control 
system in which a public listed company is required to address issues related to the internal controls. This includes 
that the board of directors should identify the principal risks and ensures the implementation of appropriate system to 
manage risks and ensure the implementation of appropriate system to manage risk, and; review adequacy and the 
integrity of the firm’s internal control systems. According to the revised BMLR (2007), …‘a listed issuer must 
ensure that its board of directors includes in its annual report a statement about the state of internal control of the 
listed issuer as a group’ (Part E, Paragraph 15.27 (b)).  
Accordingly, due to the recent development in the requirement for the directors of listed issuers, this study is 
undertaken. Specifically, this study attempts to a) develop an index to measure the level of risk management and 
internal control disclosures for Malaysian listed firms and b) measure the relationship between the board 
characteristics and risk management and internal control disclosures level among Malaysian public listed firms. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Corporate governance and risk management and internal control. 
In Malaysia, the 1997-1998 financial crisis was the trigger point to the need for better corporate governance and 
transparency among Malaysian companies (Che Haat, Abdul Rahman and Mahenthiran, 2008). Poor corporate 
governance and low level of transparency in disclosing information by the companies are some of the reasons to the 
crisis (Norwani, Mohamad and Check, 2011). These problems have drawn attention to the need of good corporate 
governance practices, increase transparency of the company’s business reporting and to regain investors’ 
confidence. The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance stated a principle that the board of directors should 
maintain a sound system of internal control. The Statement on Risk Management and Internal Control: Guidelines 
for Directors of Listed Issuers was introduced to reflect the changing regulatory environment and evolving 
approaches to corporate governance issues that have made disclosure an important regulatory tool. The Guidelines 
emphasizes the need for proper risk management which is a critical element of internal control. Reporting by boards 
of directors on the risk management and internal control system within their companies has become an important 
part of corporate governance disclosure requirements. These guidelines are intended to guide directors of listed 
issuers in making disclosures concerning risk management and internal control in their company’s annual report 
pursuant to the paragraph 15.26(b) of the Listing Requirements. In making the Statement of Internal Control, a 
public listed company is required to address issues related to internal controls as recommended by the Principle 6 in 
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance. This includes that, the board of directors should be able to determine 
the company’s level of risk tolerance and actively identify, assess and monitor key business risks to safeguard 
shareholders’ investments and the company’s assets.  
The need to integrate the internal control and risk management was analyzed by Pang and Li (2013). They stated 
that in order to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of companies operations, reliable financial reporting, 
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adherence to the law, and a sound internal system are required. These are also the fundamental objectives of risk 
management. Pang and Li (2013) further argued that internal control is only a function of management which help 
to control the pre and post of business objectives. Meanwhile, risk management has undergone all aspects of the 
management process; pre and post control and full consideration is given when risk occurs during the process. 
Moreover, risk management has more objectives to be achieved than internal control. They finally argued that 
internal control and risk management should be organically integrated as it will help to score the best effects of 
achievement. 
 
2.2. Factors influencing risk management and internal control disclosure 
 
With regard to factors influencing risk disclosure, Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey (2013) and Amran, Bin and 
Hassan (2009) were able to prove that larger companies disclose more risk information compared to the smaller 
ones. As the company expands, the numbers of stakeholders also increase. Thus, the company is obliged to disclose 
more risk information in order to cater the needs of wider stakeholders. Their finding is aligned with Linsley and 
Shrives (2006) who examined the relationship between the company size and risk disclosure. Their findings on 
correlation between those two variables are positive, but there is no significant effect on level of the risk to the risk 
disclosure. According to agency theory, larger firms need to disclose more information to different users in order to 
reduce the agency costs and the risk of information asymmetries will also decline (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; 
Inchausti, 1997). It can be assumed that, large firms need external financing. Hence, in order to convince the 
creditors and investors about their ability to manage risks, the management needs to disclose more information. 
Besides, it is believed that, large firms are able to bear the cost of additional risk disclosures (Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012).  
Xiaowen (2012) explained the scenario where companies with good performance opt to disclose more 
information on internal control in order to differentiate them with poor performance companies. Besides, good 
performance companies; measured by high profitability have almost complete governance structure that will lead to 
better disclosure of internal control.  The companies with good profitability also have sufficient fund to bear the cost 
of information disclosure.  
Kinney and McDaniel, (1989) defend that, the companies being audited by the big four auditors are more likely 
to report on internal control disclosures. This is because, large auditors are believed to have the ability to identify 
internal control problems, and subjected to litigation related incentives to pressure the companies (auditees) to report 
any deficiencies. However, the finding is not consistent with Xiaowen (2012), who found that, there is no significant 
relationship between the companies audited by the big four accounting firms with the internal control disclosure 
level.  
In Malaysia, there are quite a number of researches done on board characteristics towards some dependants. 
Ahmed Haji and Mohd Ghazali (2013) who examined the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and 
corporate governance attributes proposed these characteristics; board size, independent directors, family members 
on the board, board meetings and independent chairman on the board. They found that board size, independent 
directors, board meetings and independent chairman on the board are significant to the intellectual capital 
disclosure. Germain, Gali and Lee, (2014) conducted a research on the determinants of board structure; board size 
and board independence whether they are aligned with the requirements of the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) for Malaysian companies from 2000 to 2007. They found that the board size and board 
independence shown an upward trend form year to year. This indicated that, the MCCG has significant impact in 
influencing the board characteristics and also a high compliancy level of the public listed companies in Malaysia. 
Although the compliance to the MCCG is not mandatory, the companies are willing to comply in order to gain the 
confidence of investors. 
 
2.3 Board Characteristics 
 
Consistent with prior literature, this study examines three corporate governance attributes, namely gender 
diversity in board of directors, independent non-executive directors and board of directors with financial literacy in 
an effort to measure the level of risk management disclosure in Malaysian companies. As stated by Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti (2007), a company’s governance system is created by a series of interrelated characteristics, all of which 
are relevant to ensure good monitoring level. Hence, the measurement of several attributes of governance is a 
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preferred issue in the disclosures of literature (Li, Pike and Haniffa, 2008).    
As being stated in Principle 2: Strengthening Composition (MCCG 2012), the company should ensure that 
women candidates are sought as part of the board of directors. A study done by Julizaerma and Sori (2012) on 
gender diversity and firm performance among public listed companies in Malaysia indicated that, women directors 
may influence the company’s performance. Julizaerma and Sori (2012) studied the relation between gender diversity 
in the board of directors and company performance on 280 public listed companies in Bursa Malaysia. They 
believed that, gender diversity is a process of determining diverse characteristics and skills of a man and woman that 
will benefit the company. Furthermore, their result stated that, gender diversity could enhance the board functioning 
which will influence companies’ performance.  
Agency theory suggests that the independent directors are able to contribute expertise and objectivity that will 
minimize the opportunistic behaviors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Most researchers generally posit that board 
independence from management is the most effective tool of monitoring and to control the companies’ activities. In 
terms of risk disclosure, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) found that, board independence improve the quality of 
disclosures. This argument is based on the notion that, board independence enhances the monitoring quality and 
reduces the chances of information asymmetry. The independent board of directors is expected to monitor the 
opportunistic behavior associated with the insiders (Williams, Duncan, Ginter, and Shewchuk, 2006). Jaggi, Leung 
and Gul, (2009) also documented that a higher proportion of independent board of directors is associated with higher 
quality of reported earnings. In addition, the findings revealed by Li et al., (2008), highlight that the board of 
directors is believed to protect the interests of the shareholders. More specifically, Li et al., (2008) contended that 
the independent board of directors will help to encourage the management to disclose a realistic position of the 
companies which in turn, reflect the value relevance of intellectual capital to stakeholders. 
Alzoubi and Selamat (2012) stated that, audit committees with financial expertise will increase the capability of 
monitoring and in turn, increases the quality of financial reporting. Raber (2003) suggested that, effective board of 
directors should consist of financially literate individuals that have the knowledge on accounting procedures.   
Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2010) stated that, board of directors with financial literacy will minimize the routine 
earnings management as measured by accrual-based variables, including lower abnormal accruals and higher accrual 
quality. Besides, financially literate directors are also associated with a lower likelihood of internal control 
weaknesses (Krishnan, 2005). Said, Omar and Nailah (2013) performed a study on environmental reporting in 
Malaysia. They suggested that, boards of directors with financial background can be expected to disclose more 
information on environmental activities in the annual reports. On the other hand, board of directors with financial 
expertise might affect the companies’ policies; to monitor the accurate disclosure and better performance (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009) because the directors may spend more than enough time in advising rather than monitoring the 
companies’ performance. 
3. Sample and data collection 
 The data were obtained from secondary sources by examining annual reports of listed companies on the main 
market of the Bursa Malaysia. Year 2013 will be taken as the sample period to identify the compliance to the 
guideline on the Statement on Risk Management and Internal Control: Guidelines for Directors of Listed Issuers that 
was released on 31 December 2012. This study chose 150 public listed companies as the sample. Companies that are 
in the financial industry such as banking, insurance, trust, closed-end funds and securities are excluded from the 
sample due to their nature of business (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004 and Linsley and Shrives, 2006) and because 
these companies are governed by the additional regulation by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) (Ismail and Rahman, 
2011). Data on the board characteristics were collected from the annual reports available on the Bursa Malaysia 
website. Financial information of the companies was extracted from DataStream. This study chose performed 
content analysis in collecting and analyzing the level of risk management disclosure in the annual reports. 
 This study uses the “Statement on Risk Management and Internal Control: Guidelines for Directors of Listed 
Issuers”, as the main pillar in measuring the risk management disclosure in Malaysian annual reports. The guidelines 
presented in Appendix A-1 provides the lists of questions which help the board of directors of the company to 
consider and discuss with management when regularly reviewing reports on risk management and internal control 
and when carrying out its annual assessments. The lists of questions are not intended to be exhaustive and will need 
to be tailored to the particular circumstances of the company.   
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3.1 Measurement 
This study uses a constructed index for risk management and internal control in order to respond to Research 
Objective 1. Disclosure index measures the degree or level of disclosure items in the selected sample companies 
(Mutawaa and Hewaidy, 2010). For the purpose of this study, an unweighted disclosure index was used. The 
disclosure index is unweighted as it is assumed that each item disclosed is equally important (Alves, Rodrigues and 
Canadas, 2012). Despite that, this study uses a measurement, namely dichotomous, of zero and one to score the level 
of risk management in the Malaysian annual reports. The dichotomous disclosure index calculates the ratio of items 




















Where CSj is the total compliance score for company j where CSj can be any value from zero (0) to one (1) 
inclusive. T is the total number of items disclosed by company j. M is the maximum number of possible items that 
company j should disclose.  
 
The following table provides the measurement of variables employed in this study.  
 
Table 1: Variable for analysis of Risk Management Disclosure Level 
Variables Measurement Scale 
Dependent Variable 
Risk Management Disclosure (RMDL) 
 




1. Gender diversity (BW) 
 
2. Independent Non-Executive 
Directors (BINE)  
 
 
3. Board’s Expertise (BE) 
 
 
Proportion of women directors to total number of directors on the 
board 
Proportion of independent non-executive directors to total number of 
directors on the board. 
Proportion of directors, who have a diploma or degree or above, hold 
profesional membership, have accounting experience and expertise. 
Control Variables 
1. Company size 
2. Leverage 
3. Type of auditor 
4. Type of Industry 
 
 
Log (Total assets) 
Total Debt to Total Assets 
‘1’ for Big 4, ‘0’ otherwise 
‘1’ for consumer, ‘0’ otherwise, 
‘1’ for industrial, ‘0’ otherwise, 
‘1’ for properties, ‘0’ otherwise, 
‘1’ for trading/services, ‘0’ otherwise, 
‘1’ for others (construction, technology, plantation and infrastructure 
project companies), ‘0’ otherwise. 
 
This study employs multiple regression analysis. Regression analysis is used to examine the relationship that the 
independent variables have on the dependent variable. The regression equation used in this study is shown in the 
equation below: 
RMDL= α0 + β1BW + β2BINE + β3BE + β4SIZE + β5TDTA + β6AUD+ β7IND+ ε 
where; 
RMDL= Risk Management Disclosure Level, BW = Gender diversity on board, BINE = Independent non-executive 
directors, BE = Board expertise, SIZE = Company size, TDTA = Leverage, AUD = Type of Auditor, IND = Type of 
Industry  
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4. Results 
Regression analyses were conducted to examine the association between the dependent variable of risk 
management disclosure (RMDL) and independent variable of gender diversity (BW), independent non-executive 
directors (BINE), board expertise (BE). A set of control variables (company size, leverage, type of auditor and type 
of industry) are also included.  
Table 2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
 Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
  B SE B t Sig 
Intercept 24.112 12.36  1.123 0.012** 
BW 2.13 1.321 0.11 0.156 0.121 
BINE 0.213 1.432 0.004 0.037 0.001*** 
BE 1.301 16.864 0.04 0.23 0.002*** 
TDTA 1.20 4.91 0.27 1.167 0.006*** 
AUD  1.41 1.21 0.29 1.601 0.119 
C 10.833 4.089 0.101 0.213 0.009*** 
IP 8.889 5.213 0.175 1.705 0.090 
P  11.944 5.213 0.235 2.291 0.023** 
T/S 9.722 5.213 0.191 1.865 0.064 
O  12.778 5.213 0.251 2.451 0.015** 
SIZE  0.021 0.076 -0.095 -0.897 0.005*** 
 
Variables Hypothesis Expected sign Results Accepted/Reject 
BW H1 + + Reject  
BINE H2 + +*** Accepted 
BE H3 + +*** Accepted 
TDTA  + +***  
SIZE  + +***  
AUD  + +  
IND  + +  
Legend: n = 150. RMDL = Risk Management Disclosure; BW = Gender Diversity, measured as the percentage of women directors on board; 
BINE =  Independent Non Executive Directors, BE= Board Expertise, TDTA = Leverage, AUD = Type of auditor, C = Consumer industry, IP = 
Industrial Product industry,P = Properties industry, T/S = Trading and Services industry, O = Others industry and SIZE = Company size. 
***denotes the variable is significant at 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level 
 
Based on the regression results presented in Table 4.4, some independent variables have positive relationship and 
significant effect with the Risk Management Disclosure Level (RMDL) except for Gender Diversity (BW). As for 
control variables, leverage, consumer industry, properties industry, other industry and size have significant effect 
except industrial products, trading/services and type of auditor. It can be concluded that, the relationship between 
gender diversity and risk management disclosure level is insignificant. Therefore, the result rejects H1. This finding 
is similar to Gallego-Álvarez, García-Sánchez, and Rodríguez-Dominguez, (2010), Rose (2007) and Smith, Smith 
and Verner, (2006) as they found that companies with higher levels of gender diversity did not obviously outperform 
with other lower level companies, in terms of risks disclosure.   
The result showed BINE had significant and positive relationship with RMDL. Therefore, H2 is accepted. Thus, 
this supports the second hypothesis that, there is a significant relationship between board independence and risk 
management disclosure. Hence, the  result is consistent with Razali and Arshad (2014) Alves et al., (2011) as well as 
Lajili and Zeghal (2011) where it is found that, independent non-executive directors can be an effective corporate 
governance mechanism to improve the quality of financial reporting. On the other hand, it also positively affects the 
extent of voluntary risk management disclosure, other things being equal. Therefore, from the perspective of this 
study, independent non-executive director is one of the crucial elements to ensure the quality of risk management 
and internal control disclosure level. 
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The hypothesis H3 predicted a positive association between board of directors with financial literacy (BE) and 
risk management disclosure level (RMDL). The results showed that BE had significant and positive relationship 
with RMDL. Therefore, H3 is accepted. This result is consistent with the finding of Ismail and Rahman (2011) 
which shows that the directors with financial literacy have a significant positive relationship with the risk 
management and internal control disclosure. Another study done by Dhaliwal et al., (2010) stated that, board of 
directors with financial literacy will help to minimize the potential of earnings management in the company as the 
board is able to constrain the managers from opportunistic managerial reporting. It is also supported by BurakGüner, 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) where the authors discussed on the importance of the board of directors to have 
financial literacy when doing the policy for the company in order to ease the understanding of disclosure 
information.  
 
5. Discussion  
 
This study employs the list of questions provided in the Statement on Risk Management and Internal Control: 
Guidelines for Directors of Listed Issuers (Guidelines) (page 13) on Information and Communication. The list of 
questions was used as the measurement scale for the dependent variable; Risk Management Disclosure Level 
(RMDL). From the result, we can see that, most of the companies communicate their risk management and internal 
control to the stakeholders. The RMDL mean is 69.99 which is quite similar to the findings of the study done on risk 
management disclosure among the public listed companies in Malaysia by Ismail and Rahman (2011) as their result 
indicated the mean score of 52.79% and reflect a good compliance level among the public listed companies. Most of 
the companies realized, the embedded risk management and internal control disclosure system should be designed to 
facilitate achievement of the company’s business objective.  
The study measures board of directors’ characteristics towards the risk management and internal control 
disclosure. The result of this study reveals that, female directors had insignificant and weak relationship with the 
risk management and internal control disclosure level. Based on the data reviewed, it can be clearly seen that, almost 
fifty percent of the sample companies have zero female directors in their directors sitting on the board. Even it is 
clearly stated in Principle 2: Recommendation 2.2 (page 14) Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2012 
(MCCG 2012), “the board should establish a policy formalizing its approach to boardroom diversity”, most of the 
companies are still planning to take steps to develop the policy. Besides, based on the Statement of Corporate 
Governance published in every annual reports of the company, this study found that most of the companies are still 
looking for suitable women candidates whom are sought in the recruitment exercise. Consequently, most of the 
companies which have female directors in the sample of this study have only one woman, thus the benefits of gender 
diversity might not be fully utilized and thus the result cannot be generalized.    
For the second board characteristic; independent non-executive directors, this study found a significant and 
positive relationship towards risk management disclosure level. This study found that, most of the companies are 
complying Chapter 15, Part B (15.02 (1)) of Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement (BMLR) to have at least 33% of 
the independent directors in the board of directors. This study agreed with Li et al., (2008), that proposed the 
presence of independent non-executive directors will help to encourage the management to disclose a realistic risk 
management and internal control of the companies which in turn, reflect the value relevance of intellectual capital to 
stakeholders. Besides, the independent non-executive directors are not employees and they do not participate in the 
day-to-day management or daily operations of the company. These independent non-executive directors serve in a 
professional capacity and do not have executive roles or business ties to the company. As these independent non-
executive directors are not involved in day-to-day operations, it is believed that they are not subjected to any 
pressure by the internal organization of the company. Thus, this will help the company to disclose more on the risk 
management and internal control.      
The third board characteristic is board of directors with financial literacy. Based on the result, this study found 
that, board of directors with financial literacy had significant and positive relationship with risk management and 
internal control disclosure level. All the sample companies in this study have at least one director with financial 
literacy. Board with financial literacy was measured as a percentage of directors who have a diploma or degree in 
accounting and/or have a professional membership. Instead, this study also measures boards with accounting 
experience, experience in supervising the preparation of financial statements or expertise using financial statements 
(Badolato, Donelson and Edge, 2014). From the result, it can be justified that, all companies complied with Para 
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15.09(1) (c) of Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements. Another possible explanation to this result is that directors 
with financial literacy may have better knowledge and awareness on risk management and internal control 
disclosure. A financially literate director has the capability to visualize and contextualize the financial report. The 
implication of having the directors with financial literacy is in helping to translate what should be disclosed in the 
financial reports and to interpret the lines of risks information. Besides, directors with financial literacy will 
encourage the company to stay abreast with the ever-changing business environment, regulatory requirements and 
corporate governance developments.  
6. Conclusion  
The main objective of this study is to explore the level of risk management and internal control disclosures 
among Malaysian listed companies. From the finding in the previous chapter, it has been observed that most of the 
public listed companies in Malaysia communicate their risk management and internal control to the shareholders 
and stakeholders, reflecting good compliance level among the public listed companies. The second objective of this 
study is to investigate the relationship between board characteristics and risk management and internal control 
among public listed companies in Malaysia. The result of this study reveals that there is a significant and positive 
relationship between independent non-executive directors and board of directors with financially literacy and risk 
management disclosure level. However, female directors had insignificant and weak relationship with the risk 
management and internal control disclosure level. 
The limitations in this study are this study only covers one year period, the size and pool of the sample is rather 
small and may not be sufficient to measure the board characteristics monitoring role to the risk management and 
internal control disclosure level in Malaysia and other variables affecting risk management and internal control 
disclosure level are not taken into consideration. The result may provide valuable findings to regulators (standard 
setters) such as Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia in ensuring high quality of risk management and internal 
control disclosure level. Additionally, the findings will definitely create public awareness on the extent of risk 
management and internal control disclosure issue in Malaysia. Standard setters can use the result as a mechanism to 
oversee the function of board of directors in influencing the level of risk disclosure of the companies. It is suggested 
that standard setters may take some action to tighten the policies and procedures for ensuring the increment of risk 
management and internal control disclosure level. For future research of the study, it is recommended a larger to 
improve the results other variables may be substituted to make better comparisons of the risk management and 
internal control disclosure level in Malaysia.  
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Appendix A.1- List of Questions of Statement on Risk Management & Internal Control: Guidelines for Directors of 
Listed Issuers. 
No Item 1 0 
1 Do the board and management receive timely reports on progress against 
business objectives and the related risks to enable them to make appropriate 
decisions? 
  
2 Do the board and management receive relevant reports on progress against 
business objectives and the related risks to enable them to make appropriate 
decisions? 
  
3 Do the board and management receive reliable reports on progress against 
business objectives and the related risks to enable them to make appropriate 
decisions? 
  
4 Do the board and management receive reports with key performance indicators 
on changes in risk levels (KPIs)? 
  
5 Do the board and management receive reports with qualitative information such   
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as customer satisfaction, conversion rates, etc? 
6 Are information needs and related information systems reassessed as objectives 
and related risks change or as reporting deficiencies are identified? 
  
7 Are periodic reporting procedures, including quarterly and annual reporting, 
effective in communicating a clear account of the company’s performance and 
the achievement of company’s objectives? 
  
8 Are the established channels of communication for individuals to report 
suspected breach of law? 
  
9 Are the established channels of communication for individuals to report 
suspected breach of regulations or other improprieties? 
  
10 Is the whistleblowing mechanism independent of management?   
11 Is the whistleblowing mechanism independent of management and clearly 
communicated to all the stakeholders? 
  
12 Is the whistleblowing mechanism independent of management clearly 
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